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Well before the Maastricht Treaty and the introduction to the euro, the economic analysis 
of monetary unions had reached widely accepted conclusions. The advantages of using 
one money instead of two or more always have the same character - a reduction in many 
transactions costs.1 The importance of these advantages depends then on the actual and 
potential transactions among the territories in question: where there is little trade between 
two countries and few financial interactions, there won’t be many benefits from the use 
of a single currency; if, on the other hand, economic interrelations are many and intense, 
the gains will be much larger. 
 
What are the costs and problems in moving to a single currency? The key issue concerns 
monetary policy: what are the costs to a country of giving up its own monetary policy? 
There are two key policy variables that it loses control of. Firstly, the exchange rate can 
no longer be altered - that of the monetary union has to be accepted. This means that 
when a country encounters problems of competitiveness, it can no longer devalue its 
currency (if the exchange rate was fixed) or allow it to depreciate (in the case of a 
floating currency). Such exchange rate changes are a very effective and relatively 
painless way of dealing with competitiveness problems and unsustainable trade deficits. 
In the recent crises it has been a big advantage for Britain that it was not in the Eurozone 
and was therefore able to let the pound fall against the euro and other currencies. 
 
Secondly, to join a monetary union is to give up domestic control of interest rates. These 
are used to influence the costs of financing investment and consumption expenditures and 
thus the level of expenditure and the consequent levels of economic activity and 
employment. If the economies in the monetary union as a whole move closely together 
this may not be a problem - a common monetary policy can be appropriate for them all. 
On the other hand, if the economies diverge - some tending to overheating and inflation 
while others are in recession, then the loss of the interest rate instrument could prove to 
be very costly.2 
 
Thus divergence in competitiveness or in the general rate of production and employment 
across the member economies is a central challenge to monetary unions. How can that 
challenge be met? Standard theory pointed to two mechanisms, one based on markets, the 
other on government. Divergent rates of unemployment could be tempered through the 
market mechanism of out-migration from depressed countries or regions; and if the 
monetary union had a common public budgetary policy, a government could intervene 
through raising taxes in the more successful economies to support expenditure in those 
in difficulty. 
 
Both mechanisms can be found in the United States: if one state has higher 
unemployment than the others a lot of people will leave; while the working of the federal 
income tax and social security systems redistributes income to the states with weaker 
economic performance. 
 
Neither mechanism exists in the Eurozone. There has been some labour migration from 
central and eastern European members of the EU, but several of them, including Poland, 
the largest, do not yet use the euro. There has not been much migration among the main 
countries using the euro since the 1970s. And, since the central budget of the EU is very 
small, there is no possibility of fiscal transfers. 
 
The Eurozone - with built-in dogma 
How then was the monetary union supposed to work, without any way of coping with 
divergence? There were two views. One, which it is reasonable to associate with the 
French, relied on further institutional development or ‘creative imbalance’. Experience 
with the monetary union would show that it needed a stronger institutional framework, 
including more centralised taxes and public expenditures. At that point the EU would 
give rise to the necessary institutions. This view may still prove to be correct in the long 
run - if the EU cannot strengthen its institutions in response to current crises it will be in 
deep trouble indeed.  
 
So far, however, the opposite view has prevailed. It is correct to associate this with 
Germany (both with the Bundesbank, which acted as the model for the ECB in the same 
city, and with most German political leaders). The Eurozone does not need stronger 
institutions and can function perfectly well without any fiscal transfers. This view is 
contrary to both logic and experience, but that does not stop it being received wisdom in 
the EU and the Eurozone. The dogma is straightforward: market economies are 
intrinsically stable. If the central bank keeps inflation under control, and member state 
governments refrain from excessive spending and borrowing (that is, if they observe the 
rules of the ‘Stability Pact’), nothing can go wrong in terms of macroeconomic policy. 
There may be unemployment but that will not reflect interest rates which are too high or 
budgetary policies which are too restrictive; it can only be the result of labour market 
‘rigidities’ - employment regulation, social protection and so on - which must be removed 
by ‘structural reforms’. The fact that three decades of such reforms have done nothing to 
bolster employment (though they have done plenty to undermine wages and conditions 
and to exacerbate social injustice) only proves that they need to go much further. 
 
Provided, then, that inflation was controlled and the rules of the Stability Pact observed, 
there would be no need for active macroeconomic policies. It is interesting that these 
rules were in fact broken continuously, but not by the countries which today face the 
most acute public sector deficits. Some of these countries, notably Spain and Ireland, 
were actually star pupils when it came to budgetary rigour - they ran public sector 
surpluses while Germany, France and other high income countries failed to keep 
government borrowing within the prescribed limits. 
 
Meanwhile, huge divergences in prices and competitiveness were developing. They were 
simply ignored by policy-makers at the European Commission, at the European central 
Bank and in most of the member states. 
 
Germany - the divergence machine 
Since capitalist economies are not in reality self-correcting and self-balancing in the way 
that orthodox doctrines assert, one could have expected, even under normal conditions, 
that the economies in the Eurozone would diverge, with some becoming more and others 
less competitive against each other. However, conditions after the single currency was 
introduced in 1999 were such as to make for wide and rapid divergence. The strongest 
economy by far in the Eurozone is that of Germany, and German policy put enormous 
pressure on the weaker economies in the monetary union. Unemployment was high in 
Germany, partly because of the general economic slowdown of Western economies from 
the mid-1970s, partly because of the problems of reunification. To absorb this 
unemployment it would have been possible to stimulate domestic spending either by 
redistributing income to the most disadvantaged groups or by increasing public spending. 
Actual policy, driven by doctrines divorced from reality and by the interests of the big 
multinational groups, concerned only to reduce taxes and wage costs in their German 
base, was the opposite of this. Public spending was squeezed and welfare benefits in 
particular were cut. There was a deliberate attempt to create a low wage sector in 
Germany, in supposed imitation of the United States (no attempt was made to imitate the 
massive and repeated macroeconomic expansions brought about by monetary and fiscal 
policies in the US). 
 
The restriction of domestic demand and the squeeze on wage costs within Germany 
amounted to an enormous export drive - the only growing markets for German goods and 
services were abroad. This was a strategy of staggering irresponsibility at both the global 
and the European levels. In the global economy the US trade deficit was becoming 
increasingly difficult to finance - massive German export pressure could only complicate 
and retard the task of correcting the deficit. In Europe, many of the weaker economies - 
including the UK - had competitiveness problems which could only be aggravated by the 
big and growing German surplus. Those economies in the Eurozone that - unlike the UK 
- were unable to let their currencies fall in value faced the most intractable problems.  
 
The extent of German pressure on export markets is suggested by Table 1, which shows 
how wage costs per unit of output developed in Eurozone countries. Unit wage costs 
depend on productivity growth, which reduces them, and the growth of wages, which 
increases them. In turn, they are a major factor determining prices and inflation. The 
broad policy of the Eurozone was to keep inflation just below 2 per cent, and most 
countries managed to keep wage costs more or less in line with this target. In Germany, 
on the other hand, there has been a continuous drive to keep wage costs well below what 
was required, and this was at the expense of lower-paid workers in particular. Wages in 
Germany grew much slower than labour productivity (this redistributes income from 
labour to capital), and indeed often grew more slowly than prices, so that real wages were 
falling in the world’s most successful industrial economy. At one point the German 
government, concerned to reinforce its already overwhelming competitive advantage, 
reduced social security contributions and made up for the ensuing oss of tax revenue by 
increasing VAT. This cut the price of German exports but pushed up the price of 
imported products: it was equivalent to devaluation - a devaluation from the world’s 
largest exporter which posted a balance of payments surplus of $300 million, second only 
to that of China. (The Chinese have a much better justification for their surplus than does 
Germany; it is quite difficult for the Chinese to expand internal markets rapidly since 
infrastructure is underdeveloped - it is pointless, to use a simplistic example, to offer 
refrigerators to households without electricity; meanwhile an export drive keeps 
employment and incomes rising; no such justification can be advanced for the German 
surplus, which expresses both a blinkered conception of Germany’s own interests and a 
contempt for those of other nations.) 
 
 
Place table 1 near here 
 
 
Increasing tensions in the Eurozone 
A few of Germany's close neighbours in the Eurozone - such as Austria and the 
Netherlands - managed to live with this continuous competitive pressure, presumably by 
working very carefully to make their smaller economies complementary to the large 
German one. But as Tables 2a and 2b show, imbalances have been widening almost since 
the start of monetary union in 1999. (The fact that Germany began with a modest current 
account deficit was a consequence of German unification - for a few years the East 
German deficit wiped out the West German surplus - but soon export business as usual 
was resumed.) And no action is being taken even now to rein in Germany’s export 
pressure on its trading partners. Indeed, the European Commission cheerfully forecasts a 
widening of the surplus to 7 per cent in 2012.  
 
From the start the ‘peripheral’ countries shown were suffering a trend loss of 
competitiveness. The German surplus was a major factor in that situation, but there were 
clearly also serious policy errors in some of the countries concerned. In both Spain and 
Ireland huge speculative bubbles developed in construction and real estate. Rather than 
doing anything to counteract speculation, the authorities celebrated the economic success 
which the bubbles seemed to represent, as incomes rose rapidly and employment grew. 
Note that, as pointed out above, in neither Ireland nor Spain was there any sign of 
problems in government spending; on the contrary, both countries had public sector 
surpluses. In Greece, on the other hand, it seems that there were big problems with the 
government budget, which existed even before entry into the monetary union.  
 
Nevertheless there were clearly big payments imbalances which were rapidly getting 
bigger. How could these come about? The simple answer is that they were financed by 
borrowing.  
 
Place tables 2 a and 2 b near here 
 
Financing divergence: the boom 
Markets don’t clear; imbalances and disequilibria are ubiquitous; at any given time many 
households, businesses and countries will be in ‘unsustainable’ positions. This is possible 
because of the financial system - without it market economies could not exist. In an ideal 
world it would be clear to everyone how, and how fast, imbalances should be corrected. 
The financial system would smoothly and gradually enforce the necessary adjustment; an 
Comment [-1]: I put this in because, as 
a lay person, to me 'financed' doesn't mean 
'getting finance from financial institutions - 
which i think is what you mean here 
economic unit with a deficit position would find that the longer that deficit lasted and the 
bigger it grew the higher would be the interest rate demanded and the more 
‘conditionality’ would be attached to each refinancing operation. Effectively monitored, 
households would gradually pay down their debts, businesses would expand, contract or 
redirect their activities as necessary. 
 
Things aren’t like that. Consider the most elementary situation: someone owes you 
money but cannot pay on time. Do you refinance them or not? If you’re going to 
refinance it may be better to do so generously - no point in spoiling the ship for a 
hap’orth of tar. On the other hand, why throw good money after bad? And if you’re going 
to foreclose, best to do so right away before all the assets held by your debtor are 
dissipated. It’s not a decision which allows smooth trade-offs. Which is the right 
decision? It is not always easy to say - either course of action might succeed; either, or 
indeed both, might fail.  
 
Nor are such decisions taken independently of each other. They relate not only to the 
specifics of each loan and investment but to general business conditions: the level of 
activity and employment, widely shared expectations about the future economic 
developments, the degree of pessimism or optimism among investors. Thus credit 
conditions tend to move in the same direction for all borrowers - easy credit tends to be 
general, but when credit tightens it tends to do so drastically and across the economy as a 
whole.  
 
The peripheral economies were able to finance wide and increasing current account 
deficits because, over the first decade of the monetary union, credit conditions were 
generally easy. This was for two main reasons.  
 
Firstly interest rates around the world were low - there was an abundance of investible 
funds and monetary policy in the US was very expansionary. Secondly, the EU itself 
encouraged financial changes which reduced effective supervision over banks and 
security trading. There was in fact something of a moral panic in the European political 
class as it drew up its Lisbon Agenda for the first decade of the present century. The 
recent success of the US economy was both exaggerated and misunderstood. (The 
relatively higher growth rates that had been achieved in the US were primarily the result 
of American readiness to adopt expansionary macroeconomic policies - which EU 
leaderships, for dogmatic reasons, always refuse). Drastic action was proposed for 
Europe to ‘catch up’ - including an attempt to Americanise European financial systems 
by promoting big integrated markets for shares and government bonds. There was 
virtually no concern about the possible implications of this strategy for financial stability. 
 
There was thus a climate of easy credit and investor optimism in which deficit countries 
in the Eurozone came under no pressure to adjust their positions. The Irish and Spanish 
banks, which were financing housing booms, found it easy to raise funds in international 
bond markets; the Greek government was able to raise all the funds it needed from 
domestic and foreign creditors. 
 
Note that the flows of capital involved were private - they reflected the decisions taken 
by banks, pension funds and wealthy individuals and corporations. In terms of the 
prevailing doctrine at the European Commission, this meant that the decisions were 




The present article won’t rehearse the details of the sub-prime debacle and the 
consequent financial collapse. It can be noted, however, that, although the crisis was 
centred on the US financial system, European banks suffered even bigger losses than 
their American counterparts. What matters for the Eurozone is how the banking crisis 
rapidly became an acute crisis of public finance.  
 
In the case of Greece, the problem of public finance was already there, although it had 
been masked by inaccurate official statistics. But now investors were alarmed and extra 
cautious - they started to scrutinise the public finances very closely. In Ireland and Spain 
on the other hand, and in many other countries, the budgetary crisis was a direct 
consequence of the banking crisis. Huge amounts of public money were used to bail out 
to refinance illiquid and, in many cases, insolvent banks. It was also necessary to increase 
public spending to compensate for drastic reductions in spending by companies and 
households. Had this not been done the recession provoked by the financial collapse 
would have been much more severe. Meanwhile tax revenues fell rapidly because of 
declining economic activity and the losses posted by both banks and other companies. 
  
Britain itself had more than its share of these problems. But the debts of the British 
government are denominated in sterling and it was possible to let sterling depreciate on 
the foreign exchange markets. Also, the Bank of England, although rather slow to 
recognise the scale of the problem, has moved to providing very cheap credit to the 
financial sector and, through the purchase of government bonds, to the government as 
well.  
 
For countries using the euro, depreciation was obviously not possible. And the scale of 
the destabilisation in several of the weaker economies was such as to make it difficult to 
cover the governments’ borrowing requirements. What could be done? Take a look again 
at Table 2b. It can be seen that Ireland’s massive current account deficit was almost 
eliminated between 2008 and 2010. This was done by deflation - by a massive reduction 
in incomes and employment. Irish GDP fell by 12 per cent in two years. Borrowing by 
the Irish government in 2010 amounted to 32 per cent of GDP; any thought of continuing 
to use public spending to compensate for reduced private spending was abandoned - huge 
tax rises and spending cuts now intensified rather than buffered the impact of falling 
private consumption and investment. 
 
If the weaker economies could increase their exports this would be an ideal response to 
the crisis - a big increase in exports would both sustain employment and improve the 
financial position of companies and the government. But their accumulated loss of 
competitiveness since the launch of the euro makes this impossible. We have combined 
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crises of competitiveness and public finance. Since they cannot change the value of their 
currencies, these countries will have to ‘adjust’ via lower imports brought about by lower 
rates of investment and consumption, that is by unemployment and falling incomes. 
 
Now such a situation is not anomalous; it corresponds exactly to the standard analysis of 
monetary unions. These need to have fiscal transfers from strong members to weaker 
ones; otherwise divergences can only be corrected through deflation - falling incomes and 
production - in the members facing the most acute problems. The governments in Ireland, 
Greece and Spain are certainly largely responsible for the fact that their countries are 
most affected by the crisis - but the crisis itself is a logical consequence of the way the 
Eurozone was constructed. 
 
Illiquid or insolvent? 
Throughout 2010, various Eurozone governments came close to defaulting on their debts. 
The consequences of such a default are hard to calculate: perhaps the bankrupt 
government would choose to leave the Eurozone so that it could meet its basic needs for 
cash from a national central bank under its own control; public default would inevitably 
be followed by widespread private default - in particular by pension funds holding the 
bonds of the government in question; renewed banking crisis in Northern Europe would 
be very likely because the big banks of France, Britain and Germany have lent a lot of 
money to the governments in question; and public confidence in the Eurozone as a whole 
would probably be shaken, if not destroyed. On the other hand, default might take the 
more organised form of a ‘rescheduling’ of payments under the auspices of EU 
institutions, in which case these problems, although still acute, might be manageable.  
 
So far the European Union has always managed to stave off such a default. Partly this has 
been through the European Central Bank buying up government debt - its holdings of 
securities, to the value some 80 billion euros before the crisis in January 2007, stood at 
450 billion in January 2011, and a lot of this is Greek, Irish, Spanish and Portuguese 
paper. The ECB was not supposed to become a big creditor of Eurozone governments - 
the whole structure was meant to avoid the ‘monetisation’ of government debt - but given 
the threat to economic and financial stability and the failure of other EU institutions to 
resolve the situation, the ECB stepped, quite correctly, into the breach.  
 
Intervention by the European Commission and the member states has been late and 
reluctant. When it seemed that Greece was about to default, some emergency support was 
organised, but within weeks it became clear that further resources would be needed in 
Greece and elsewhere. In May 2010 the EU established a European Financial Stability 
Fund (EFSF - although it is an agency of the EU as a whole, it is designed essentially for 
the Eurozone), with total funds of some 450 billion euros. It was from this money that 
emergency loans for the Irish government were arranged at the end of 2010. But the 
EFSF itself may prove to have insufficient resources if the government of a big country 
such as Spain needs emergency refinance. 
 
A more fundamental problem is that the EFSF, which is due to be dissolved in 2013, and 
the European Central Bank, are only lending hard-pressed governments money to avoid 
default in the short-run. This would be enough if these governments only faced a problem 
of illiquidity - that is, if they had enough future revenues to pay down their debts, or at 
least to stop their indebtedness increasing. However, it is doubtful whether this is the 
case. It may be that some of these governments are insolvent - they won’t have enough 
resources to pay their debts either now or in the future. If this is so, if they are essentially 
insolvent, emergency loans only put off the evil hour of default. 
 
Whether default becomes inevitable depends on a number of factors.3 One is the rate of 
economic growth - with rapid growth government revenues grow, and some 
expenditures, on unemployment relief, for example, fall. However, the prospects for 
growth in Ireland, Spain and Greece are not good. The scale of tax rises and expenditure 
cuts means that no growth will be stimulated by the public sector; households and 
corporations, hit by unemployment and recession, are reining back their spending; and 
the economies concerned are too uncompetitive to expand their exports, so that export-
led growth is also improbable. The Commission has published ‘stabilisation plans’ which 
foresee rapid growth throughout the EU, but these are extremely unconvincing.4 
 
Another key factor influencing solvency is, of course, the interest rate. A level of 
indebtedness which is manageable at 3 per cent may become quite unbearable at 9 per 
cent. And here the debtor countries are in a vicious cycle: the very possibility of default 
leads creditors to demand a higher rate of interest to compensate for the risk - but that 
higher rate of interest itself makes default more likely. Eventually the vicious cycle ends, 
but it ends badly: investors see that it is self-defeating to push up interest rates any further 
and simply refuse to lend. 
 
The tribulations of Angela Merkel 
The EU therefore needs to move from the short-run management of the crisis to an 
attempt at lasting resolution. In terms of economics it is reasonably clear what is needed. 
The problem is that the economically logical solution is politically unacceptable in 
Germany, the largest and strongest member state. 
 
What has to happen is a (partial and conditional) Europeanisation of the debt - not as a 
temporary measure, as with the EFSF, but on a definitive basis. A permanent agency can 
be established, with strong guarantees from the EU itself and from all the member states, 
to take over enough of the debt of the worst affected countries to restore clear financial 
stability. The Eurozone as a whole is immensely rich and powerful and it would be easy 
for such an agency to borrow on a large scale and at very low interest rates.  
 
Other institutional changes would necessarily accompany any such measure. If the 
Eurozone as a whole was taking responsibility for public debt in member countries, there 
would have to be a certain centralisation of tax and public expenditure decisions. It is 
difficult to see how this more collective arrangement could work without a certain 
redistribution of resources from stronger to weaker countries. The ‘creative imbalance’ 
theory would finally come into its own. The monetary union would be complemented by 
a meaningful federal budget - a ‘transfer union’ would emerge.  
  
The problem is that many in Germany regard a transfer union as a nightmare. They think 
it would mean German taxpayers picking up the bill for irresponsible behaviour in other 
countries and a permanent drain of resources. After the difficulties and costs of German 
unification there is little enthusiasm for an analogous experiment on a Europe-wide scale. 
Now this position is rather one-sided. Germany benefits enormously from the European 
Union - which gives it a vast extension of its home market - and from the Eurozone, 
which eliminates exchange rate fluctuations between Germany and its partners: in the 
past such fluctuations were often very destabilising.  
 
However, Angela Merkel has chosen to reflect, rather than to challenge, German 
reluctance to contemplate major institutional developments in the EU. She has agreed to 
replace the EFSF, due to expire in 2013, with a permanent body, the European Stability 
Mechanism. The European Council endorsed this proposal in December and the EU 
Treaty will be amended to establish the new institution. Some such change was 
unavoidable - otherwise many governments would have found it impossible to roll over 
their debts as 2013 approached, and, with it, the end of support from the EU. 
 
In all other respects the change is minimal. The European Stability Mechanism will be 
directly financed by Eurozone governments - it will not issue its own bonds, presumably 
because such a move was regarded as moving too much financial responsibility away 
from national governments. Also, there will be very restrictive conditions on access to the 
Mechanism. Governments in trouble will only be partially refinanced - they will also be 
expected to undertake a partial default by imposing a ‘haircut’ (a write-down of the debt) 
on holders of government bonds. The bonds themselves are to be reworded to make 
rescheduling and haircuts easier - but it remains to be seen whether investors will be 
ready to buy such securities. The Council declared: 
 
In the unexpected event that a country would appear to be insolvent, the 
Member State has to negotiate a comprehensive restructuring plan with its 
private sector creditors, in line with IMF practices with a view to restoring 
debt sustainability. If debt sustainability can be reached through these 
measures, the ESM may provide liquidity assistance. 
 
Unless, before 2013, there is a drastic improvement in the economic situation in the 
European periphery, these provisions are likely to be tested. If tested, they are likely to 
fail, and yet more ad hoc interventions will be needed to stave off a major collapse. 
Meanwhile, to the danger of serious instability in Ireland and Greece must be added that 
of a contagious spread of crisis to other highly indebted countries - not only Spain and 
Portugal but also Italy and even Belgium.  
 
The mood in Germany is indicated by the 2009 enactment of the Schuldenbremse, which 
will make public sector borrowing unconstitutional in Germany after 2016 (for the 
Federal government) and 2020 (for the Länder). The EU cannot be effectively governed 
while its strongest member state indulges such fantasies. But no other member state, it is 
depressing to report, has challenged the German positions. 
 
East and Central Europe 
Because this article is about the Eurozone, it has not discussed the situation in the EU’s 
Eastern and Central European member states. However, it should be pointed out that the 
situation in several of them is worse than in the peripheral states. The largest of them, 
Poland, is in reasonable shape. But elsewhere, a decade of high growth, fuelled by 
speculative capital inflows, culminated in collapse and consequent recession and 
simultaneous competitiveness and public debt crises - just as described above but with 
much greater intensity. Although most of these countries still retain their own currencies, 
in preparation for entry to the Eurozone many of them, such as the Baltic Republics, 
operate fixed exchange rates against the euro, so that, like Ireland, Spain and Greece, they 
cannot restore competitiveness by letting their currencies depreciate. 
 
 
Place table 3 near here 
 
Table 3 indicates the general pattern. Big imbalances emerged in many of the new 
member states. In the crisis, as capital inflows went into reverse, these were brutally 
corrected - simply through deflation, declining production and mass unemployment. It is 
a sign of the loss of political cohesion in the EU that the Commission abdicated 
responsibility for the new member states in the crisis, simply inviting in the IMF to 
organise emergency refinance on the usual conditions of expenditure cuts and 
deregulatory ‘reforms.’ This failure of solidarity may cost the EU dear in the future. 
 
Conclusion 
The crises which strike the European Union are very predictable. Absurd policies are 
adopted - such as a monetary union without fiscal transfers, or the deregulation of finance 
with no concern for stability. Well-founded criticism is ignored. The policy does indeed 
fail, but its failure is not acknowledged - rather, the original position is repeated with 
Brezhnevite consistency. Thus the Stability Pact, with its arbitrary targets for public 
borrowing, is not amended a jot in the face of a comprehensive destabilisation of public 
finance. On the contrary, the Commission demands a return to the norms of the Pact - by 
2013! 
 
It is ironic, in an institution so given over to markets and competition, that many of the 
most serious errors in the EU stem from a failure to understand - at the most elementary 
level - the nature of capitalist economies. These require abundant liquidity, elastic (and 
therefore vulnerable) supplies of credit, an effective supply of public goods and 
government budgets which work to compensate for private sector fluctuations. 
 
The present arrangements to stabilise the Eurozone are inadequate and will not work. 
That will not prevent EU leaderships declaring them to be completely satisfactory up to 
(and beyond) the eve of the next crisis. 
 
To conclude, a word about the position of the British government. They are going along 
with the restrictive and inadequate reforms proposed by Angela Merkel and adopted in 
Brussels at the end of 2010. They try to give an impression of lofty detachment - this is a 
Eurozone problem and Britain is not involved. Although successive British governments 
are quite right to refuse to join this dysfunctional system, they have a lot riding on it. 
While the crisis persists our biggest export markets will stagnate. British banks are 
holding 400 billion dollars worth of Greek, Irish, Portuguese and Spanish government 
bonds - if these states default our banks could be in trouble. 
 
In a longer view, we need to reconstruct the Eurozone because in the end we are quite 
likely to join it.5 Given the series of blunders and disasters that is British economic 
history since the 1950s one has to be a super-optimist to foresee an indefinite future for 
sterling. After one crisis too many we may have to give it up and sue for entry into the 
European Monetary Union. Better make sure that it will be worth entering.  
 
Notes 
1. Ronald Coase, a pioneer in the field, at one point gives the following list of 
transactions costs: search and information costs; decision and negotiation costs; 
monitoring and enforcement costs. 
2. The two policy variables referred to - interest rates and exchange rates - are not 
independent. They interact in very complex ways, but it is not necessary to discuss these 
interactions here. 
3. Readers looking for a detailed (and highly critical) account of the Eurozone situation 
could see Wolfgang Münchau’s column in the Financial Times on Mondays. 
4. For an extended critique of EU policies see the latest EuroMemorandum, available 
online at www.euromemo.eu.  
 5. See my article ‘Time to join the EMU?’, in Soundings 43, for a discussion of the terms 
on which Britain should join the Eurozone.  
